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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks into the political discourse surrounding the doping scandal that has 
developed in Russian sport over the last two years. The paper hypothesizes that because of the 
importance of nationalism and Russia’s great power status, the Putin regime has, despite 
publicly stating the opposite, actively contributed to the further politicization of sport by 
returning to a sport discourse closely resembling that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
By taking a historical perspective, comparing the narrative of the Soviet Union surrounding 
sports during the Cold War and that of the Putin administration in the aftermath of the 
Mclaren reports, the paper will try to establish the similarities and differences to be found in 
the two narratives. It will do so by using the existing academic knowledge regarding 
propaganda and discourse of the Soviet period regarding sport, and publications, interviews 
and news articles by the Russian government in the last few years. These sources will be 
examined through political discourse analysis, a methodology from the social sciences. It is 
very compatible with the historical perspective this paper uses to contextualize the current 
climate of sports discourse in the field of politics. 
This paper will highlight the importance of sport for the legitimacy of the Putin administration, 
linking nationalism, national pride and the “Russia as a great power” narrative as 
conceptualized by Bo Petersson, to show that the Putin regime has backed itself into a corner, 
where reinforcing its Soviet-inspired discourse on sport has become important in order to 
retain its legitimacy. 
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Appendix 1: List of Abbreviations 
 
ARAF Russian Athletics Federation 
EU European Union 
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
FSB Russian Federal Security Service 
GDR German Democratic Republic 
IAAF International Association of Athletics Federation 
IOC International Olympic Committee 
NKVD Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennih Del (People's Comissariat of Internal Affairs, 
Secret Police under Stalin) 
NOC National Olympic Committee 
PDA Political Discourse Analysis 
RFU Russian Football Union 
ROC Russian Olympic Committee 
RUSADA Russian Anti-Doping Agency 
SED Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
TASS Informatsionnoye agentstvo Rossii TASS 
UEFA Union of European Football Associations 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WADA World Anti-Doping Agency 
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Introduction and Structure of the Thesis 
 
The run up to the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics witnessed a major scandal that shocked the 
sporting world.  An independent investigation, sanctioned by the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(known as WADA), and written by Canadian lawyer Richard H Mclaren, reported of a large-
scale, government sponsored doping program that had been taking place in Russia since 
roughly 2010. This report proved only to be the tip of the proverbial iceberg: A second report, 
published in November 2016, further substantiated the allegations made towards the Russian 
government and sporting bodies. 
It is certainly not the first major doping scandal in elite sports. In an attempt to show the 
supposed ‘superiority’ of socialism over Capitalism through success in international top-level 
sport, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) established a clandestine doping 
program in 1974-75, authorized by top officials in the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and top 
government bodies.
1
 All possible state organs, including the countries’ respective secret 
services were involved in misleading the international sporting community. Accusations of 
clandestine doping programs have also been raised against the Soviet Union as well as other 
members of its satellite system in Eastern Europe, albeit perhaps more modest in scale than 
was the case with the GDR.
2
 In the 1990s it was China which was under suspicion for state-
run doping practices.
3
  One might conclude from this list of examples that it was mostly 
(former-) communist countries who were suspected of doping programs or even caught in the 
act, but this does not paint the full picture: A number of western sports authorities (including 
ones from the United States) turned a blind eye to potential transgressors on their own team, 
justified by an argument along the lines of “they are doing it so we can too!”.4 
The point of this short summary of known or alleged doping scandals is not to criticize the 
cleanliness of sport or an alleged failure of doping control (in the end, athletes were caught). 
What this list does show, is that, especially since WWII, sport has often been a very 
politicized area. States have often seen sports as a means for achieving certain policy goals. 
                                                          
1
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Historian John Wilson states that sport can be seen as a tool, “available for use for a variety of 
purposes such as competition for educational resources, combating juvenile delinquency, 
enhancing military preparedness, boosting civic pride, and achieving diplomatic goals”.5 As 
social scientists Mike Dennis and Jonathan Grix claim, sport has been used as a political 
resource for centuries, often as a part of an attempt to create a sense of statehood among 
citizens. 
6
 Sporting ‘mega-events’ are most certainly a part of this equation as well. 
Calculations by host cities/nations for holding a sporting mega-event (such as the Sochi 2014 
winter Olympics or the planned 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia) are often based on the 
perceived international prestige and credibility that can be gained. Thus, both external and 
internal policy goals can be achieved through sports. 
With regards to the recent doping scandal, Russian officials immediately countered the 
Mclaren report, questioning its validity, and the Russian foreign ministry even called it “a part 
of Washington’s ongoing effort to isolate Russia and to build opposition to Putin inside 
Russia”.7 Regardless of whether the accusations of WADA are in fact true and the doping use 
in Russia was government-steered or controlled, the Mclaren report has once again led to a 
highly politicized sports climate in the last year. In fact, a high-level ‘war of words’, or 
perhaps a ‘discursive war’, is being fought out between Russia on the one hand, and 
International sport organizations, such as the IOC and WADA, and even government officials 
of other countries, on the other. Russian officials have accused these organizations, as well as 
other countries, of ‘politicizing sport’ for their own gain. The refusal of the Putin regime to 
accept the conclusions of the Mclaren report has led to a major upheaval in the sporting world. 
When examining more closely, the rhetoric expressed by this regime seems to show 
remarkable similarities with the Cold War period, where accusations of doping were quite 
common on either side of the ‘iron curtain’, and the West (or the US and its European allies) 
were pitted against the East (the Soviet Union and their Communist allies). 
This paper will attempt to answer the following questions: How has Russia responded to the 
accusations in the Mclaren Reports, and what are the deeper, underlying reasons for this 
response? 
Structure 
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The thesis will begin by explaining the central concepts and theoretical framework used in 
this research. We will investigate the discourse surrounding the Russian doping scandal 
through a multidisciplinary approach, combining concepts from history, political science, and 
social sciences, including linguistics to provide an extensive answer to the research question. 
Since we are looking specifically at discourse, the main methodology used for thesis will be 
that of political discourse analysis, as interpreted by linguists Isabela and Norman Fairclough 
in Political Discourse Analysis: A method for advanced students. This framework is used to 
analyze the potential underlying reasoning for the discourse chosen by the Putin regime. This 
discourse will then be contextualized by putting it in a historical perspective. 
Once the methodology of the thesis has been explained, the paper will continue with a 
thorough analysis of sports in the Soviet Union. As historian Robert Edelman argues, multi-
sport festivals, of which the Olympics were the most visible example, “allowed the Soviet 
regime to ascribe an array of changing symbols, slogans and meaning to sport”.8 Until World 
War II, the USSR boycotted the Olympic games (despite Russia being a founding member of 
the IOC) which were characterized as “designed to deflect the workers from the class struggle 
while training them for imperialist wars”.9 Therefore, this historical analysis starts by 
providing an overview of the USSR’s sport policy goals from 1945 onwards, when the Soviet 
Union sought to establish itself a world power, including in the field of sports. Besides policy 
goals, the political discourse surrounding these goals will also be described. The discourse 
used around the Olympic boycotts of the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980 and the reciprocal 
boycott by the Soviet Union and its allies of the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 1984 are of 
particular importance in this regard. 
Once the sporting paradigm of the USSR has been discussed, a brief overview will also have 
to be given of sport policy during the turbulent 1990s. This turbulent period, where sport was 
not considered a priority in Russian politics, provides a stark contrast to the Soviet period. 
This chapter will then follow the timeline leading up to the establishment of the Vladimir 
Putin regime that has now been in charge in Russia for more than a decade. In various ways, 
political scientist Andrey Makarychev argues that the main facets of the political narrative 
presented by Putin’s current regime are ‘sovereignty’ and Russia as a great power.10  Political 
                                                          
8
 S. Wagg and D.L. Andrews, East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2007). xii 
9
  Ibidem 
10
  ndre  Stanisla o ic Makar che , "From Sochi – 2014 to Fifa – 2018: The Crisis of Sovereignty and the 
Challenges of Globalization," in Mega Events in Post-Soviet Eurasia : Shifting Borderlines of Inclusion and 
4 
 
scientists Derek Hutcheson and Bo Petersson make a similar case, pointing out that, Putin’s 
legitimacy, defined as “a popular belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the right to 
govern”, rests on three pillars: “the maintenance of economic growth; the creation of domestic 
order; and the skillful use of myth to project the president as the bulwark against chaos and 
foreign threat, in the process reinforcing Russia’s status an unequivocal ‘Great Power’”.11 
This paper will try to show the importance of these policy goals and their consequences for 
sports in modern day Russia compared to the USSR. What are the biggest similarities and 
differences? And, most importantly for answering the main question of this thesis, what are 
the similarities and differences in political discourse? After a period in which Russia shied 
away from sports, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, more funds and attention have 
been given to sports again during the 2000s. This process will be described, including the role 
of the Soviet sports legacy during this development. This chapter will also focus on the Sochi 
2014 Winter Olympic Games, since they provide an excellent moment to gain insight in the 
official Russian narrative surround sports, and the importance attached to it.  
In chapter 4, this paper will discuss the recent crisis surrounding Russian sports, which does 
not only include the still developing doping scandal, but will also include an explanation of 
the 2015 FIFA corruption scandal in the difficulties Russia is currently facing in maintaining 
a steady course regarding its sports policy and discourse. The doping scandal, beginning in 
2015 but escalating in 2016, will be discussed extensively, with particular emphasis on the 
responses of Russian government officials to the accusations made in the various reports 
commissioned by WADA, as well as the reports of ‘whistleblowers’ whose confessions led to 
further investigations. It is these responses by Russian leaders that showcase the resemblance 
in discourse and tactics between the Soviet Union sport discourse and that of modern day 
Russia. 
Finally, in the conclusion, the paper will be summarized and analyzed. This last part of the 
paper will discuss whether Russia has indeed returned to practices and policies previously 
established by the USSR, or if this hypothesis has been proven untrue, based on potentially 
significant differences found during review of the available information. It will also discuss 
the most likely reasoning underlying the Putin regime’s discourse, and what potential 
consequences this discourse has for both Russia and the International sporting community. 
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With the information presented, it will be possible to place the current political course 
followed by the Kremlin in a larger perspective, and explain its origins. By looking at the 
usage of sport in Russia through the lens of history, it will hopefully become easier to 
understand how we reached the current climate. 
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Chapter 1: Concepts and Methodology 
 
The concept of political narratives, or ‘political myths’, is of particular importance for 
understanding investment in sports in Russia. A political myth in this paper is defined along 
the lines of Bo Petersson, as a “narrative that is believed to be true or acted on as if they were 
believed to be true by a substantial group of people”.12 In the context of Russia, the political 
myth that Russia had, has and always will have a great power status plays a particularly large 
role in the political climate.
13
 This viewpoint makes international prestige incredibly 
important, and this is where sports come into play. In the last decade, sport has become an 
important component of the Putin regime in an attempt to gain international prestige and 
boosting national pride. It is the hypothesis of this paper that the Putin regime has tried to so 
by returning to a political discourse surrounding sports closely resembling that of the Soviet 
Union, and that the 2016 doping scandal has only lead to an intensification of this discourse.  
This thesis will try to show that in order to retain its domestic power, it is of vital importance 
to the Putin administration to discredit the findings of the Mclaren Report. As political 
scientist Andrey Makarychev notes in “Sporting Mega-Events in Post-Soviet Eurasia”, Russia 
faces a “severe crisis of Sovereignty”.14 This crisis, according to Makarychev, stems partly 
from the Ukraine conflict, which made Russia subject to international economic and financial 
sanctions, as well as diplomatic isolation. Makarychev further focuses on the crisis present in 
the Russian football industry and the crisis in legitimacy that FIFA still faces, but it is another 
point that he makes that is relevant to this thesis. His key argument is that “the long term 
repercussions of this triple crisis stretch far beyond sport and elucidates the inherent weakness 
of the Kremlin’s project of boosting Russia’s role and status in the world through hosting 
exorbitantly costly and pretentious world-scale performances”.15 While Makarychev refers to 
the 2014 Sochi Olympics and 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, one could easily put the 
doping scandal in the same category: If one takes the Mclaren Report at face value, it is not 
hard to find the link between boosting prestige and elite-sports performances that win medals. 
The Mclaren Reports have done the exact opposite of boosting prestige; in order to save face 
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and maintain the narrative of Russia as a great power, with Putin as its strong leader, Russian 
officials had very little other options than discrediting the research and findings on its alleged 
state-run doping program, and present the findings as a larger conspiracy against Russia. This 
paper will try to show convincingly that this is indeed the case, while also noting potential 
unintentional consequences of this policy. 
This thesis will investigate the discourse surrounding the Russian doping scandal through a 
multidisciplinary approach, combining concepts from history, political science, and social 
sciences, including linguistics to provide an extensive answer to the research question. Since 
we are looking at discourse, the main method used for thesis will be that of political discourse 
analysis. According to social scientists Teun van Dijk, political discourse analysis (PDA), can 
be understood as “the analysis of political discourse from a critical perspective, a perspective 
which focuses on the reproduction and contestation of political power through political 
discourse”.16 This definition, also characterizes political discourse as attached to political 
actors – individuals, political institutions and organizations, engaged in political processes and 
events. As linguists Isabela and Norman Fairclough note, PDA “needs to incorporate an 
explanatory viewpoint, the point of view of an explanatory critique, in assessing how actual 
discursive practices contribute to maintaining or transforming a given social order, including 
existing power relations”.17 Discourse, in this view, is seen as “social use of language in 
social contexts”, or in the case of politics, “the language associated with a particular social 
field or practice”.18 Furthermore, discourses are “ways of representing reality”, a particular 
paradigm through which to see the world. 
In the social sciences and in PDA in particular, social life can be conceptualized as the 
interplay between three levels of social reality: social structures, practices and events. Social 
events are concrete individual instances of things happening (e.g. a doping scandal being 
discovered), people behaving in certain ways, or people acting (including by means of 
language). Social structures are a more abstract concept, which is defined by Fairclough and 
Fairclough as “structures, systems and mechanisms which social scientists postulate as causal 
forces in terms of which events and practices can be explained”.19 In the particular case 
investigated in this study, the main social structure in focus is the Russian “great power 
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narrative”, the political myth described by Bo Petterson as vital to Putin’s legitimacy. 
Although the relationship between structures, practices and events is quite complex, one can 
safely argue that social structures such as these can directly influence practices, which 
consequently shape events. 
At the core of PDA, is the idea of practical reasoning. While political decision-making and 
action is not always determined by the force of the better argument, but perhaps by power 
interests, this does not mean that argumentation and reason is not at the heart of politics. As 
Fairclough and Fairclough note, “reasons for favoring certain lines of action rather than others 
may include such goals as holding on to power or increasing it, so power can be and often is 
itself a reason for action. Even if this is an unreasonable argument in the eyes of some, it is 
still an argument”.20 Decision-making processes are thus argumentative in nature. Fairclough 
and Fairclough define argumentation as a verbal social activity, in which people attempt to 
criticize or justify claims. In this case, through challenging the conclusions and findings in the 
Mclaren report, the Putin regime has made these findings the claims central to the debate. 
Following this line of thinking, the main question in this paper thus tries to lay bare the 
discourse expressed in public statements by Russian top officials, and the underlying 
argumentation for this discourse. To come to a conclusion on a line of action (in this, the use 
of a particular discourse), agents operate with hierarchies of goals and hierarchies of values.
21
 
In the case of the doping scandal, I argue that the reasoning on which this discourse is based, 
values the legitimization of the Putin regime, and thus its consolidation of power, higher than 
any potential consequences this might have for the sporting world. This requires Russia’s 
great power status to be expressed through sporting successes and mega-events, and not being 
tainted by accusations of a state-run doping program. 
Fairclough and Fairclough argue that textual analysis in critical discourse analysis, comprises 
both interdiscursive analysis, and language analysis.
22
 Interdiscursive analysis of a text 
identifies the genres, discourse and styles that are drawn upon. This can show how previous 
discourses, such as the political discourse regarding sport in the USSR, play a role in shaping 
the discourse of today: 
 “Texts are shaped but not determined by existing orders of discourse in which genres, 
discourses and styles are articulated together in relatively established and conventional ways; 
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social agents in producing texts may combine genres and/or discourses and/or styles in 
unconventional ways; and such innovative combinations can be semiotic aspects of social 
changes taking place in behavior and action, which may ultimately be established as changes 
in social practices and in orders of discourse” 
This paper will emphasize the clear connection between the central components of the 
discourse used in the Soviet period, and the current discourse of the Putin regime. It will be 
argued that the discourse used by the Soviet Union, is now mirrored in the current discourse, 
albeit with one major change: the central tenet is no longer the superiority of communism as 
an ideology, but instead the superiority of Russia and its administration. Thus, nationalism has 
replaced communism. This change in sports discourse is also reflected in a general change of 
social practices, and these two processes feed into each other. A quote, often attributed to 
Mark Twaine (although sources for this are lacking), sums up the situation hypothesized here: 
“history does not repeat itself, but it often rhymes”.23 
To assess this discourse, public statements from President Vladimir Putin and other officials 
such as Current Vice-Premier Mutko, previously minister of Sport, will be analyzed. These 
can be found on the English web pages of Russian government institutions and officials, but 
also on English speaking news websites such as TASS, a Russian state-owned news agency, 
that is at least in theory independent. While it is not within this scope of this thesis to do 
extensive research towards the truth regarding the ‘independence’ of TASS, it will be made 
clear in this paper that the narrative presented on TASS closely resembles the official line 
followed by the Putin regime, and therefore provides excellent insight in the narrative that the 
regime is attempting to establish. Ample research has already been done towards the sport in 
Russia and the political discourse surrounding it in previous eras, such as the Soviet period. 
Emphasis will be placed on the narrative and argumentation used by Soviet leaders for their 
heavy investments in sport. The importance of propaganda surrounding sports and the 
Olympic Games for Soviet policy goals both domestically and internationally will be 
described, using the body of academic work available. 
As the author of this thesis does not read or write Russian, the scope of the paper will be 
limited to English publications. Although this limits the ability of this paper to make 
definitive statements on the consequences of the doping scandal and the following discourse 
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in Russia itself, it does not limit the ability of this research to show the clear red thread 
running through political discourse surrounding sport that the Putin regime is trying to 
establish, in particular when it comes to discrediting the research of the Mclaren reports in the 
international sports and political arena. Due to time constraints, the cut-off point of the paper 
is January 2017. Although the doping scandal and its consequences are still developing, by 
then, the political discourse in response to this scandal had been well established, and is 
unlikely to change in direction or tone in the months that follow. 
  
11 
 
Chapter 2: The Rise of Sport as a Political Tool in the 
Soviet Union 
 
This chapter will describe the current academic knowledge available regarding the use of 
sport in politics and propaganda in the USSR, starting after the Second World War, when the 
Soviet Union joined the Olympic movement and sports became an important ideological 
‘battlefield’. It will focus mainly on the narratives presented by the Soviet Union, but also 
describe the narratives present in Western media during the Cold War era. The connection 
between doping usage and the propagandistic narratives will be dissected as well. This will 
provide us with the basis for a comparison of the current strategy used by the Putin 
administration in regards to the 2014 Sochi Olympics and subsequent doping scandals leading 
up to the 2016 Rio Summer Olympic Games. 
The link between sport and politics 
Despite the enormous growth in importance of sports and sporting events during the last 
century, one thing has remained the same: The position of the IOC that “sport is above 
politics”, and that sport’s moral purity should be guarded.24 In 2015, the IOC Executive Board 
approved the latest revision of the Code of Ethics, which it describes as “an integral part of 
the Olympic Charter”.25 Within this charter, the second ‘universal fundamental ethical 
principle’, the foundation of Olympism, is the following: “respect of the principle of the 
universality and political neutrality of the Olympic Movement”.26 It is interesting to note that 
this narrative can also be found in the discourse of the Putin administration: “Don’t Politicize 
sports”, says Vitaly Mutko, while Alexander Zhukov, former president of the Russian 
Olympic Committee, stated that “sports is beyond politics”.27 
However, if one takes a good look at professional sports in current times, it is nearly 
impossible to uphold this position. This stance has, in fact, led to international sports 
organizations turning a blind eye to abuses of Olympic ideals, which in itself is a political 
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statement.
28
 It is easy to find examples of this: Already in the 1930s the Japanese invasion in 
Manchuria did not stop the IOC from awarding the 1940s Olympics to Tokyo, nor did the 
actions of Nazi Germany lead to exclusion.
29
 One could make a comparison here to the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia, where this did not seem to cause any doubt among FIFA 
officials about the planned World Cup of 2018 in Russia. Of course, if political neutrality was 
not mentioned in its charters, this would undoubtedly only further complicate things. If the 
IOC or other sporting organizations started taking sides in political or military struggles, this 
would automatically exclude certain parties from partaking in sporting events, making them 
even more political than is the case when trying to maintain neutrality. It is important to note 
however, that neutrality itself is also a political statement. Sports have always been 
intertwined with politics. As John Wilson argues in Playing by the Rules: Sport, Society and 
the State: “Without rules to define access to decision making and authority – the stuff of 
politics – sport would not exist”.30 
The USSR’s political goals through sports 
As sports historian James Riordan notes in Sports in Soviet Society, widely recognized as the 
first academic book about sport in the Soviet Union, sport took a central place in the Soviet 
Social system.
31
 It was useful to the Soviet regime because of its inherent qualities of being 
easily understood and enjoyed, being capable of developing mass enthusiasm, being 
superficially apolitical, and permitting safe self-expression. Riordan states that “Especially in 
a society which, in a short span of time, experienced three revolutions, a civil war, rapid 
industrialization, forced collectivization of agriculture, purges, mass terror, and two world 
wars, sports has been important as a broad channel for the discharge of emotional tensions.
32
 
According to this seminal work, the roots of Soviet sport in part lie deep in Russian history, 
the people’s habits and traditions, the climate, state’s preoccupation with external and internal 
enemies, and the intellectual ferment of Russian society in the latter part of the 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 centuries. After the Second World War, the USSR set a new national target: to catch up 
and overtake the most advanced industrial powers, including in sport.
33
 The pre-war 
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pyramidal structure of sports administration was re-established and refashioned to suit the 
new circumstances, and incentives such as cash prizes and the allocation of scarce 
commodities were installed for setting records and winning championships. Athletes were 
even to receive salaries and bonuses, further encouraging the formation of an elite of sports 
stars.
34
 All of this despite the fact that ‘amateur’ athletes were still the norm according to the 
rules of international sport federations. This meant there was a big difference between the 
appearance projected to the outside world and the reality of the Soviet sport system, which 
already at this time started to professionalize.
35
 Accompanying the new focus on sports was 
also a purge of famous sportsmen who had contacts with foreigners prior to the war, in order 
to ensure it was the central government that could control the information coming in and out 
of the sports world regarding Soviet practices.
36
 
The Party Central Committee outlined new targets in December 1948, entailing reinforcement 
of the organization sports collectives, and ensuring the all-round expansion of all sports, but 
with particular attention given to sports that featured prominently in the Olympic Games. The 
Committee also attempted to improve the sports amenities available to collectives and 
societies, as well as heightening the responsibility of coaches and instructors for the 
performances of their charges, and extensively utilizing the press, radio and cinema for 
popularizing sport among the public. Dr. Matveyev, a former medical advisor to the pre-war 
All-Union Physical Culture Council, said: “Sport in the Soviet Union has two objectives: 
propaganda for abroad, and the physical training of the Red Army and NKVD (Security 
Police). The victories abroad make excellent domestic propaganda. People have little to be 
proud of otherwise… the average Russian thinks ‘If Dinamo can beat a French team, 
obviously the French have even less bread and meat than we do’. This is exactly what the 
Soviets wish people to think, as a sort of justification for their hunger and consolation for the 
evils of the system”.37 
The USSR in the Olympics 
Before the USSR joined the Olympic movement, the Soviet Sports Committee, led by 
chairman Nikolai Romanov, had to balance demands from the international sporting 
organizations and the IOC (ascribing to amateurism of athletes, founding a National Olympic 
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Committee that was supposed to be independent of its government) with conditions placed 
upon them by the Soviet leadership: To gain permission to go to international tournaments, 
Romanov had to “guarantee victory, otherwise the ‘free’ bourgeois press would fling mud at 
the whole nation”.38 The fact that the USSR leadership was not willing to send athletes abroad 
without a guarantee for victory clearly shows the importance of sport as a political tool. In the 
end, as historian Jenifer Parks describes, the questions over the amateur status of Soviet 
athletes and the threat of state interference in the IOC proved less significant when the matter 
of accepting a Soviet NOC and a Soviet member to the IOC came to a vote. The IOC, wanting 
to live up to its ideals of internationalism and to maintain its prestige, voted to recognize the 
Soviet NOC in May 1951, partly based on the argument that since they didn’t ask this of other 
nations, they shouldn’t investigate Soviet sports regulations either.39 
In addition to logistics and training, the Soviet Sports Committee also had the image of the 
Soviet Union to consider. From the very beginning of the USSR’s Olympic participation, 
propaganda and imagery was considered of equal importance: All information related to 
international sport to be released by TASS (the Soviet news agency), would solely be released 
with the agreement of the Central Committee Department for Propaganda and Agitation.
40
 
Control of the Soviet Union’s image had to rest with the Central Committee, not with Western 
journalists. As Jenifer Parks shows, in general, the Soviet Union only sporadically opened up 
to foreign press regarding sports affairs, and when it did, this was through “well organized, 
strategically timed displays of hospitality designed to further increase the Soviet Union’s 
international prestige”.41 In the end, the first Olympic participation of the USSR at the 1952 
Olympic Games of Helsinki was declared a success by the Politburo, since they had tied the 
US at the games in terms of results, according to an unofficial points system used by the 
international press.
42
  
Soviet propaganda used its participation in the Olympic movement to justify the political 
acceptability of the Soviet Union at international level, while, interestingly enough, criticizing 
“the reactionary policy of the imperialistic West” exploiting international sports for their 
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political means and goals.
43
 It also presented the Soviet Union as a model participant, 
supporting the Olympic goals of peace, friendship and international understanding. 
The political usage of sport continued in the following decades, for example with the biggest 
domestic sporting event of the 1950s, the first ‘Spartakiad of the People of the USSR’, held in 
Moscow between 6 and 16 August 1956. It was intended to be an event of political and social 
significance in the lives of Soviet people, and its importance was marked by the presence of 
all prominent Party leaders and a number of eminent foreign guests, such as the then president 
of the Olympic Committee, Avery Brundage. This event was even meant to be a culturally 
unifying force, with various communist slogans worked into the various displays and 
performances accompanying the games.
44
 
Sports now became a means of continuing the war against the remaining enemy, the 
bourgeois-democratic states of the world. Sports success was intended to be a morale booster 
to assuage doubts about the superiority of the Soviet system, to provide a justification for all 
the efforts and sacrifice made to attain a strong state and higher standard of living. Strict 
control of the sports movement through functionaries of the security forces, including 
warnings to players that they too, were subject to political conformity and to coercion, made 
sure Soviet athletes kept to themselves, not engaging in contacts with foreign sportsmen, nor 
communicating information about foreign societies to Soviet citizens. It is important to note 
though, as Parks does, that “The Soviet Union did not introduce a highly nationalistic 
atmosphere into IOC debates, but rather, the Soviet Union’s entrance in the early years of the 
Cold War took this already present trend to a new ideological level”.45 
Propaganda and Doping Use 
In a total of eighteen Olympic appearances, when counting both summer and winter Games, 
the Soviet Union ranked first in the medal count a staggering thirteen  times, finishing second 
on all its other occasions. Despite ceasing to exist for over twenty years ago now, it still 
currently ranks second in the all-time medal count, with only the US outscoring it.
46
 It was a 
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main focus for many propaganda schemes by the Soviet Union. This should not be surprising: 
As James Riordan mentions, “apart from the early years of space exploration, sport was the 
only area in which the Soviet Union could demonstrate superiority over the leading capitalist 
states – in the full flare of the world’s media”.47  
Already from the beginning of the USSR’s participation, rumors spread in Western media and 
academic journals about Soviet athletes’ steroid use. As Sociologists Rob Beame and Ian 
Ritchie show, researchers like Dr. Nicholas Wade, Robert Windsor and Daniel Dumitru 
claimed a direct link between Nazi “steroid-fueled soldiers” in Eastern Europe and  to Soviet 
ambition with sporting success.
48
 These claims, as unsubstantiated as they were, transformed 
rumor into an apparent medical fact, and they still continue to appear in scholarly publications, 
medical periodicals, medical conference presentations, and newspapers.
49
 This scary image of 
linking the Soviet Union to the horrors of the Nazi regime was of course very useful for anti-
Soviet propaganda, in particular in Britain and the US, who had specific ‘information’ 
activities set up to spread stories about atrocities and problems within the Soviet Union.
50
 The 
Soviet Union answered with an equal amount of propaganda from their side, as described 
above.  
Beyond the propaganda, the actual use of doping, in particular anabolic steroids, was on the 
rise both in the West and the Socialist states. Sports Sociologist Paul Dimeo has conducted in 
depth research that illustrates how widespread doping use was for a significant period.
51
  In 
the US, Dr. Robert Zeigler, a coach with the US Olympic Committee, helped develop an 
anabolic steroid known as ‘Dianabol’, with the full knowledge of the US sporting authorities. 
In the USSR, on the other hand, James Riordan argued convincingly, there had been “long-
term state production, testing, monitoring and administering of performance-enhancing drugs 
in regard to athletes as young as seven to eight”.52 The list of positive tests and the assumption 
of widespread usage during the 1970s and 1980s is well documented.
53
 It is interesting to note, 
that the USSR and GDR have come to bare the bulk of the blame for sports doping, with 
Western governments pointing the finger at these now no longer existing communist states as 
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the main culprits. Dimeo explains the reason for this has less to do with the actual amount of 
doping use, but more so with “first, the complicity and abuses of the state [while Western 
states denied any involvement in doping use of its athletes] and second, a combination of 
primary source evidence and changing political circumstances [the fall of the GDR and USSR 
regimes]”.54 
A point that is very important to make in this context, is that drug use for performance 
enhancement only became taboo during the 1960s and 1970s. As Ian Ritchie notes, various 
forms of drug use have been used in sporting contexts for thousands of years, and “the 
condemnation and moral panic about drugs would come much later in time, under a very 
specific set of social and political circumstances”.55 A first statement of principle, with anti-
doping as a subset of the ‘amateur values’ mentioned in the Olympic Charter, first became 
important shortly before the Second World War, and with both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ now 
committed to the use of anabolic steroids to improve performance and win medals, the IOC 
tried to get a grip on the situation.
56
 The current historiography of modern sport does not 
really provide an answer as to why the acceptance of drug use gave way relatively sudden to 
an ethos of anti-doping, but is very well possible that the Cold War and its political climate 
played a role. 
The Height of Sport Propaganda: The 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games 
Increasing political tensions between the US and the USSR turned the Olympic Games of 
1980 in Moscow and of 1984 in Los Angeles into, as historian Evelyn Mertin puts it, “victims 
of the Cold War”.57 On both sides political campaigners, sport officials and journalists were 
involved in heavy Public Relations campaigns trying to influence public opinion and foreign 
decision makers, leading ultimately to a US-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games, and 
subsequently to the 1984 boycott of the Los Angeles Games by all Socialist athletes. After the 
successful bid for the Olympic Summer Games in 1980, the Soviet Union immediately 
proclaimed this choice as an “unconditional acknowledgement of the Soviet athletes’ leading 
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performances” and as proof that “the world sports leaders basically approved the peace loving 
foreign political course of the Soviet government”.58  
The extremely strong link between sports and government propaganda in the Soviet Union 
becomes obvious once more if one looks at the role of the organizing Committee for the 
Moscow Games, “Olimpiada-80”. Aside from being responsible for preparing the actual 
Olympics, it was also instructed to increase their international sporting contacts, and report on 
foreign press activities concerning the Olympic preparations in Moscow. The aim was to 
ensure that the Soviet propagandists could monitor foreign reactions and if necessary, control 
the narrative by presenting their own publications.
59
 As Mertin shows, a large publicity 
campaign was staged, not just towards the socialist bloc and its inhabitants, but also with 
special emphasis on an international component.
60
 The eventual boycott, which was part of 
the response of US President Jim Carter to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 
1979, was in Soviet propaganda countered by publications presenting the US as the villain, 
with American athletes as the victims: The invasion of Afghanistan was never mentioned as 
the real reason for the boycott campaign, while it was emphasized that the Kremlin had 
guaranteed that the games would be staged according to the Olympic Charter.
61
  An important 
thread in the Soviet response to the boycott, as well as in the responses of various Olympic 
officials, was that the US was violating one of the most important tenets of the Olympic 
movement: the separation of politics and sport.
62
 
Four years later, it was the USSR itself that decided to boycott the Olympic Games. 
According to Mertin, this was more of a last minute decision than a planned retaliation for the 
American absence during the previous games. Several leadership changes within the Soviet 
Union (from Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko between 1982 and 1984) in the years 
leading up to the 1984 Los Angeles Games saw different attitudes to Olympic participation. 
However, ultimately, rising tensions between the US and the Soviet Union following the 
shooting down of a South Korean plane in September 1983, led to a declaration on 9 May 
1984, stating that the Soviet Union would not attend the Olympics.
63
 M.V. Gramov took over 
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the role of head of Soviet sport in late 1983, coming directly from the propaganda department 
of the Central Committee, once again showing the clear link between these departments. The 
media campaign leading up to the Soviet boycott this time focused on critique of the LA 
games’ capitalist funding (the first Olympic Games to be funded privately), failure to comply 
to the Olympic Charter again, and reports of LA as a “center of anti-Soviet organizations”, 
which they argued meant there was a need for extra assurances regarding Soviet athletes’ 
safety that were not given by the host city.
64
 
Key Points 
During the Cold War, sports and propaganda became inextricably linked, if they weren’t 
already since the infamous 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. It is clear that the Soviet Union saw 
the Olympic Games as an excellent way to promote itself both domestically and 
internationally, with sport being one of the few areas through which it could argue for the 
supposed superiority of the communist ideology. The Committees and departments in charge 
of sport were closely linked to those involved in Propaganda for over thirty years. Of course, 
the ideological component of the political discourse in the field of sport will no longer present, 
now that Russia has transitioned into ‘state capitalism’. However, the narrative of showing the 
greatness of Russia through sporting achievements, mentioned in the introduction, could still 
show remarkable similarities with the narrative presented in the Soviet Union. Doping, and 
more specifically doping accusations, played a major role in the propaganda from both sides 
of the Cold War. It seems to have been a state-run affair in the USSR, but they were not the 
only country where doping was used on a large scale. In fact, this seems to have been the case 
all around the globe, with the difference being that in cases like the GDR and the USSR the 
state was more clearly involved. This should not be a surprise, with the Soviet NOC being 
much less independent as its counterparts, and with the clear importance of sporting success 
for the Soviet’s narrative of ideological superiority. It is this discourse of the superiority of the 
USSR that will be compared to the discourse used by the Putin regime.  
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Chapter 3: Interruption and Continuation: Sport in the 
Post-Soviet era and the Beginning of the Putin Regime 
 
This chapter will first briefly discuss the transitional period between the Soviet Union and the 
Putin administration in Russia and its implications for Russian sports policy, in order to 
establish whether the current regime’s approach to sports is a direct continuation of previous 
policy or perhaps a second round of institutional change since the demise of the USSR. This 
will be followed by an analysis of the political usage of sport by the Putin government, in 
which nationalism plays a big role and will therefore also be given attention. This chapter 
specifically looks at the language and discourse surrounding the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics. 
From Soviet Union to Russia: Sports from 1985 to the 2000s 
It becomes nearly impossible to argue that the Putin’s period in power (including the 
Medvedev presidency) is a direct continuation of the USSR’s sport policy when looking at the 
devastating impact the fall of communism has had on Eastern Europe in its entirety. As 
Riordan notes, one of the major legacies of the European communist era is a transitional 
period that in many places led not democracy, but to what has been called “post-Marxist 
kleptocracy”.65 Russia underwent a brief period of ‘illusory freedom’ before robber-baron 
capitalism took over for almost the entire 1990s. In this period, under Boris Yeltsin, the first 
post-Soviet president (1991-1999), various mafia gangs, run on ethnic lines, bought up 
Russia’s key strategic assets at around 20 per cent of their actual market value.66 When 
Vladimir Putin succeeded Yeltsin as Russian president, some of these shady figures 
repositioned themselves as oligarchs, now operating within boundaries set by the regime. 
Putin started to operate as a neo-authoritarian dictator over Russia, with state capitalism as the 
primary objective. Before we move on to the Putin period, a brief overview of changes in the 
Russian sport sphere will be given from the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachov until the 
beginning of the Putin administration. 
In 1985, one year after the Los Angeles boycott and five years after the Moscow games, 
Mikhail Gorbachov presented the radically new policies of perestroika (restructuring) and 
glasnost (openness) to the Soviet Union. Glasnost meant, among many other consequences, 
the exposure of the old system of sport to public scrutiny. Victims of repression began to 
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publish their memoirs, including former sports stars whom the public had idolized.
67
 While 
the Olympics were a diversion from the realities of living under communism and an 
ideological tool for the regime before, the rapid political change that occurred showed, to 
many people, that elite sport was associated with “privilege, paramilitary coercion (the two 
largest and best-endowed sport clubs in all communist states were the armed forces clubs and 
the security forces club – Dinamo), hypocrisy (having to pretend that communist athletes 
were amateur when they were being paid by the state and given either army officer sinecures 
or fictitious employment) and distorted priorities (the huge sums of money that were lavished 
on sports stars and the Moscow Olympics, while sport facilities for the masses – not to 
mention hospitals, schools, housing and consumer goods for the public generally – were poor 
and minimal)”.68 Further revelations were the confessions that the Soviet NOC was a 
government-run institution and that its chairman had to be a member of the Communist Party. 
Additionally, the Soviet state manufactured, tested and administered performance-enhancing 
drugs to its athletes (while condemning bourgeois states for encouraging drug-taking).
69
 
Statistics by previous Soviet leadership about millions of regular active participants in sports 
were declared fraudulent, and only eight per cent of men and two per cent of women were 
actually engaged in sport regularly. 
Riordan even goes so far as to argue the Olympics played a crucial role in the changes that 
occurred, by opening up the country to other countries and cultures. He quotes Eric 
Hobsbawn, who stated that “the assent to communism of the masses depended not on their 
ideological or other convictions, but on how they judged what life under communist regimes 
did for them, and how they compared their situation with others. Once it ceased to be possible 
to insulate populations from contact with, or even knowledge about, other countries, these 
judgements were skeptical”.70 The argument that authoritarian hosts expose themselves to 
outside influences through a mega-event such as the Olympics, is not new, but has in fact only 
gained more prominence with the rise of globalization in recent times.
71
 This is therefore good 
to keep in mind when this paper goes on to discuss the most recent mega-events in Russia. It 
is also clear that the political discourse of supposed superiority was impossible to uphold in 
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the post-soviet era, and even more importantly, this imagery and discourse was no longer a 
priority in a time of major upheaval of Russian society. 
Major Changes in Sports and Sports Policy 
The worst aspect of the old system was considered to be the misplaced priorities, and in the 
post-Gorbachov era these priorities radically changed. Sport and every other aid and subsidy 
came to an end. The sinecures of an army commission and “eternal” studenthood for top 
athletes were removed, and the forty-two sports boarding schools were dismantled.
72
 This, in 
turn, led to a massive “brain and muscle drain” of top athletes, coaches, sport medics and 
scientists, who without communist incentives, turned to market incentives elsewhere to make 
their living. By 1995, more than 300 soccer, 700 hockey and 100 Russian basketball players 
were working in North America, Asia, as well as Western and Eastern Europe.
73
 This new and 
subordinate status of Russia’s sports was of course a blow to Russian nationalism, 
underscoring its decline as a world power.  
The new political elite, so called ‘New Russians’, together with the ‘nomenklatura’ 
companies (bought far beneath their market value) became very influential in sports during 
the 1990s. Sport sponsorship was seen as a way to put a “healthy gloss” on their public 
image.
74
 No expense was spared in order to achieve sporting success. The take-over by 
Roman Abramovich (whose company also happens to own Moscow’s army football team 
CSKA Moscow) of English Premier League club Chelsea  is the typical example of this 
attitude: Chelsea’s wage bill during the 2003-2005 seasons was by far the highest of any 
football team in the world.
75
 The methods introduced by this new elite to promote commercial 
sport were often primitive to the extreme. It included the fixing of results, bribing of referees, 
and even “hit” killings of those who stand in their way or expose their nefarious operations.76 
One could argue that this situation resembled that of football in Colombia, when drug barons 
took over the football scene in the country with similar appalling methods, with politics and 
national pride also playing a huge role.
77
  National pride in Russia however, took a serious 
blow during the 1990s and early 2000s. The Russian football team’s performance at the 1994, 
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1998 and 2002 World Cups were at best mediocre, while the once-dominant ice hockey team 
was eliminated in the semi-finals of the sport’s inaugural World Cup in 1996, and the 
basketball team failing to qualify for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics.
78
 
It was not just the financial and political situation that worked against Russia gaining any big 
sporting successes. Starting with the Winter Olympics in Lillehammer 1994, the program of 
the Games was expanded considerably, with most of the new additions being in sports that 
Soviet and Russian athletes were not traditionally strong in. As a result of all these 
circumstances, Russia dropped from a last overall first place in 1994 all the way down to 
eleventh place in the medal rankings in Vancouver 2010, where according to minister of sport 
Mutko, Russia competed intensely in only thirty out of eighty-six medal disciplines, and in 
five sports out of fifteen.
79
 
Nationalism continued to be heavily intertwined with sports. Already since 1926, football 
riots were part of the Soviet sports scene: As sport historian Robert Edelman mentions, 
rooting for local teams provided a safe cover for national sentiment.
80
 After the breakup of the 
USSR, which was followed by the breaking up of All-Union leagues, this nationalist 
sentiment disappeared temporarily during the 1990s. However, football as an arena for 
nationalism still remained. This was highlighted to the extreme when in mid-December 2010, 
Moscow was disrupted by the biggest riots in recent years, when thousands gathered at 
Manezhnaia Square to protest against the death of a Russian football supporter killed during a 
brawl with youth from North Caucasus. Rioters were seen shouting nationalistic and anti-
Caucasian slogans.
81
 
To summarize the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Putin 
regime, it was clear that a coordinated, political narrative was absent in the field of sport for 
this time. Sport was simply not a priority, and there were less successes to feed into a ‘great 
power’ or superiority narrative. Nationalism however did continue to play a major role in the 
sports environment. 
Putin and Nationalism 
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Sport does not operate in a vacuum. Developments in the field of sport will of course be 
influenced by developments in the political situation of a country. As Pål Kolstø, professor in 
Russian Studies, points out, the break-up of the Soviet Union also meant that the share of 
ethnic Russians rose from just above 50 per cent in the USSR, to 81 per cent in the Russian 
Federation.
82
 The Putin regime not only condoned strong nationalism, including xenophobic 
attitudes and expressions, but actively encouraged it, trying to exploit it for their own 
purposes.
83
 
While some hardline nationalists have ended up in the anti-Putin administration, feeling 
betrayed by Putin’s welcoming of immigrant laborers, the Putin regime continues to use 
nationalism as a major political tool. Putin’s national model, presented for example in an 
article published before the 2012 elections, combines ethno-nationalistic sentiments regarding 
the “mission” of ethnically Russian people and a state-centered orientation that still includes 
the notion of a strong “Russian empire”, including ethnic minorities.84 This can for example 
be seen during the annexation of the Crimea, which was sold to the Russian people in starkly 
nationalist language: It was presented both as an ingathering of Russian lands in a strong 
Russian state and as a defense of ethnic Russians abroad. As a result, Putin’s popularity, 
which had dropped significantly, partly due to the financial crisis, reached its former heights 
of 85-87 per cent.
85
  
Intertwined with this stronger focus on nationalism, is a narrative that focuses on the ‘great 
power’ status of Russia. As political scientists Derek Hutcheson and Bo Petersson point out, 
Putin’s popularity rests on three pillars: “the maintenance of economic growth; the creation of 
domestic order; and the skillful use of myth to project the President as the bulwark against 
chaos and foreign threat, in the process reinforcing Russia’s status an unequivocal ‘Great 
Power’”.86 Putin’s legitimacy is largely centered on his ability to ‘deliver the goods’, based 
among other reasons on the reputation he managed to establish during his first two, 
economically successful presidential tenures. The economic difficulties that have piled on 
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since sanctions where put in place against Russia (in response to the Ukrainian crisis), make it 
necessary for Putin to look for other ways to bolster his regime.
87
 
Political myths, defined as “a common narrative that comes with an emotional attachment that 
motivates political action”, are an important tool for the Putin regime. As Hutcheson and 
Petersson argue, the claim to be recognized as a great power is closely intertwined with 
Russian national identity.
88
 Another important myth for Putin’s legitimacy describes Russia as 
cyclically experiencing ‘Times of Troubles’, which can only come to an end by hard efforts 
from the Russian people, united under a great leader who rescues the country from disaster.
89
 
These myths will be important now that we focus our attention on sports again. 
The arena in which Putin was still regarded as having achieved most by 2014 was in restoring 
Russia’s international pride.90 Russians also overwhelmingly share Putin’s famous declaration 
that the collapse of the USSR was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth 
century”. Recent Putin rhetoric has focused on the perception of external threat, most notably 
from the US and its allies.
91
 The Soviet Union and the Cold War are thus still a part of the 
rhetoric of the current regime. The next section will show how sports and the official 
discourse around sports played a significant role in these aspects. 
Sporting Nationalism and the development of Sport under Putin 
As political scientist Vitalii Gorokhov notes, and as explained in chapter two, “Sporting 
rhetoric in politics and sports policy as a national issue are integral parts of the legacy that 
Russia inherited from the Soviet period”.92 Political scientist Alan Bairner states, “Sport is 
still far more likely to contribute to the perpetuation of strongly held local, regional and 
national identities than to the construction and consolidation of a homogeneous global 
culture”.93 It is precisely for this reason the Putin regime has attempted to harness the power 
of sport, in a similar fashion to its USSR predecessor. Gorokhov mentions the term “sporting 
nationalism”, meaning a nations’s aspiration to display excellence in sport.94 This can lead to 
a ‘spillover effect’, where the nationalist sentiment or ideology configured and promoted 
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through sports affects non-sporting political processes. If we consider the three pillars that the 
Putin regime’s legitimacy is based on, this is precisely how this administration is attempting 
to use sport as a political tool.  
In Putin’s own words, 2002 was “really the year when we started paying permanent attention 
to sports and fitness, and their funding- or was it a bit earlier?”95 It was also in 2002 that the 
Federal Agency for Sports and Body Culture was created to replace the State Committee for 
Sports and Physical Education of Russia, which had been created in 1991 after the major 
political changes that took place with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The importance of 
sport for the Putin regime can be seen in the establishment of a Sport TV Channel, with the 
main aim of “promoting a healthy lifestyle, sports and Russia’s achievements in sports”.96 
When congratulating the TV Channel for existing for five years, Putin stated that thanks to 
this channel “all of us will celebrate the successes of our athletes and will feel proud of our 
country’s achievements”.97 In the years that followed, the Russian government invested 
significant amounts of money into federal sports programs. A special federal program – called 
the ‘Strategy for Development of Physical Education and Sports in the Russian Federation’- 
was implemented in 2006, with a project budget of more than 100 billion rubles ($4.07 
billion).
98
 Giving sports even more prominence, the Ministry of Sport, Tourism and Youth 
Policy was established in 2008. When discussing the disappointing results in the Vancouver 
2010 Olympics, Putin mentioned that in the 1990s, “hardly anything was invested in our 
sports infrastructure during that time, and much of the Soviet infrastructure had become worn 
out”.99 It is clear Putin sees a clear distinction between this period and his administration, 
which, according to him, “has not neglected sports over the past eight or ten years. In fact, we 
have spent serious money on sports…. Almost 3.5 billion rubles were spent to prepare our 
national team for the Vancouver Olympics between 2006 and 2009”.100  
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The political use of sports definitely shows a resemblance to the approach used during the 
Soviet period. Firstly, similar to the Soviet approach, the policies implemented set targets 
regarding mass sport participation, with a final goal of involving up to 40 million people in 
sports by 2020.
101
 Simultaneously, there is a clear prominence of elite sport goals in the 
policies implemented. Olympic results are considered vital for national prestige. Leading 
athletes, according to Putin, “should be paid a substantial monthly allowance”.102 It should be 
noted though, that the last 20 to 30 years have seen a convergence in national sporting 
programs, with most developed countries rewarding athletes financially for their results. 
Secondly, in interviews and public statements, the Putin administration, while clearly 
pursuing political goals such as boosting national pride and prestige through sports itself, 
criticizes other countries for turning sports into a ‘political issue’. In an interview preceding 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Putin said that “attempts to turn the Olympics into a political 
issue are an attack on the Olympic spirit itself”.103 As mentioned in the introduction, Vitaly 
Mutko, Sports Minister of Russia, also stated “Don’t politicize sports”, while Alexander 
Zhukov, president of the Russian Olympic Committee, even went so far as to state that “Sport 
is beyond politics”.104 Thirdly, Russia is continuously presented as a leading sports nation, 
partly using the Soviet legacy to do so. As an example, Putin said Russian sport educators are 
“considered to be the best in the world in many sports”.105 Before the 2008 Olympics, Putin 
bragged proudly that “between 1996 and 2004 the Russian team has won a total of 243 
medals – eighty-five gold, seventy-six silver and eighty-two bronze medals. We are in a 
strong position among the three leaders in the unofficial medal standing together with China 
and the US”.106 During the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Russian Olympic 
Committee, Putin stated that Russian athletes “have attained prestige for their country and 
built up the glory of a world-class sports nation”.107 
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The Sochi 2014 Olympics and its Preparations 
In recent times, Russia has mostly attempted nation building through so called sporting 
‘mega-events’, defined by Maurice Roche as “large-scale events which have a dramatic 
character, mass popular appeal and international significance”.108 Gorokhov adds to this that 
hosting mega-events demand political will. Hosting a sports mega-event gives a host nation 
sufficient resources for reaching a global audience, giving the opportunity to enhance 
international recognition, boosting the prestige of the nation (Russia as a great power), and 
securing the legitimacy of the existing political regime. For the domestic audience, which is 
not likely to see direct economic benefits, the national government is likely to highlight non-
material values such as belonging to the nation, national honor, and patriotism.
109
 The more 
successful the event is, measured mostly by sporting success but also by not having too many 
headline-making news that could shift the focus away from the sporting agenda (boycotts, 
scandals, etc.), the stronger the effects for the regime. Strength in sport can then be used as a 
display of national power. This effect is especially strong when a good result is achieved in a 
“national sport”, which the domestic crowd identifies with.110 The 2014 Olympic winter 
Games in Sochi thus provided an excellent chance for Putin to achieve political goals through 
sport.  As Bo Petersson and Karina Vamling argue, the Sochi Winter Games were “a welcome 
opportunity for Putin to display strength and resolve and demonstrate that his is still a much 
needed strong hand at the helm”.111  
The Putin regime is actively trying to enforce their idea of a Russian national identity through 
sports. As Philipp Casula shows, this was clearly visible in the bid book of the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics, which shows how the Games were designed and intended by its organizers.
112
 
Similarly to the discourse surrounding the 1980 Moscow Olympics, Russian officials argue 
that in this bid book that Russia is a modern democracy, easily fulfilling political criteria 
(criteria to which, as Casula notes, the IOC has never paid much attention). This put Russia in 
a position to use the successful bid for the Olympics as a means to legitimize its institutions 
and regime. The brand of nationalism the Putin regime aspires to is also clearly present in the 
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bid book: ethnic diversity is hailed as an asset, but it is also made clear diversity has to stay 
within its limits, politically silent, controlled, and is presented as a security risk.
113
 This 
mirrors Putin’s views, who has emphasized that “ethnic Russians are the group that dives our 
nation’s development”, while adding that “Russia’s strength lies in the fact that it is a multi-
ethnic and multi-faith nation”.114 The bid book also mentions that Sochi 2014 will “galvanize” 
the nation, helping to achieve national pride and national purpose.
115
 
During the preparations, Putin tried to project an image of being closely involved in all 
possible ways , inspecting Olympic sites in February 2013, but also going so far as to deliver 
thinly veiled threats regarding potential delays:  “After the journalists leave, I will tell you 
what failures to meet the deadlines will amount to. I do not want to frighten anyone, but I will 
speak to you as people I have known for many years now”.116 
Since a victory in the overall medal count was less certain in Sochi compared to the 
Universiade, Russian officials sought a balance between confidence and caution in their 
messages concerning the expected results. Mutko was the first official to publicly announce 
the objective of winning in overall medal ranking, but Zhukov and Putin also mentioned that 
Russia should aim for the highest spot.
117
 This objective led to several new strategies to 
ensure a good result: both naturalization of international high-profile athletes, as well as 
headhunting for world-class coaches and other professionals now become a top priority within 
Russian sports. This recruitment was positioned as a sign of strength: “Russia is strong not 
because foreigners join it, but foreigners join it because Russia is strong”.118 Although one 
can never be sure about the accuracy of surveys from a country with strictly controlled media, 
a public survey related to Sochi seems to confirm that the Russian public bought into this 
message.
119
 Thus, one can conclude that in this sense, the goal (presenting national strength 
through winning the home Olympics) justifies the means, when it comes to the naturalization 
of foreign athletes. Although by now almost all countries make this connection, one can draw 
parallels with sport in the USSR, where the Olympics was similarly seen as a means to show 
superiority and strength. The importance of the event can also be seen in the enormous costs 
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of the event: Sochi in the end became the most expensive Olympics (both Winter and Summer) 
of all time with an estimated cost of around 51 billion (!) dollars.
120
 
Already during the XXVII Summer Universiade, held in 2013 in Kazan, Russian top public 
officials attempted to turn this event into a display of national excellence, by continuous 
media coverage in state-sponsored national media, and with Putin participating in the opening 
ceremony, followed by an appearance by Medvedev in the closing ceremony.
121
 Russian 
athletes won a sheer unbelievable amount of 292 medals, of which 155 were gold medals, but 
most likely due to the absence of any real rivaling competitors (China was second in the 
medal standing with twenty-nine gold medals), this result did not gain a clear-cut, positive 
appreciation among the domestic audience; instead, critics pointed out the large amount of top 
professional athletes that Russia had entered into the “student” competition that the 
Universiade is supposed to be (a sort of ‘medal engineering’).122 From the government 
administration, this led to Minister of Sport Mutko and President Putin  both responding in 
public to critics, with Putin going so far as to calling these critics “Ill-natured people” and 
suggesting prescriptions of Viagra to cure their grievances.
123
  
Where the Russian government positioned the Universiade as a sort of “prologue”, the Winter 
Olympics in Sochi 2014 were supposed to be the main course. It is interested to note that 
under the Putin regime, the set-up of Russian sports organizations shows a certain 
resemblance with that under Soviet times. For example, Gorokhov mentions that recruitment 
for all key public positions related to Sochi 2014 was based “exclusively on the ground of 
personal loyalty to president Putin and not on the ground of professionalism, experience, or 
past success in the field”.124 Already when the USSR joined the Olympic movement, a 
concern of the IOC was that a Soviet Olympic Committee would not be an independent 
organization, but attached to the government. Now, for the Sochi Olympics, Aleksandr 
Zhukov, member of the supreme council of the pro-president party United Russia, who held 
several government positions, became the head of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC), 
while Vladimir Kozhin, head of the Department of Presidential Affairs since 2000, held an 
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appointment as an ROC vice-president and simultaneously became the President of the 
Russian Winter Sports Association.
125
 It is quite easy to see the resemblance. 
Was Sochi a Success? 
If one looks purely at sporting achievements, Sochi can absolutely be considered a success for 
Russia.  Russia finished on top of the medal table, with four more gold medals than the 
USA.
126
 . In the end, the Russian team won thirteen gold medals, with naturalized athletes 
winning five individual medals and three gold medals as part of Russian teams, and foreign 
coaches contributing to seven out of thirteen Russian gold medals and nineteen out of thirty-
three medals in total.
127
  
As mentioned above however, the success of such a mega-event, in particular one with such 
clear political goals attached to it, cannot be measured solely in terms of medals. As Andrey 
Makarychev notes, the opening ceremony of the Sochi Olympics was meant to deliver a 
narrative of Russia as a great power and autonomous pole in the world, coupled with an 
imagery in which the Soviet Union has not disappeared, while bound together in an explicit 
Putin-centrism sovereignist discourse.
128
 Unfortunately, only fourty world leaders attended 
the opening ceremony. In terms of achieving international prestige, one could argue that this 
signals a failure to gain respect from the international community, despite attempts by the 
regime to improve Russia’s image, for example by declaring amnesty for certain prisoners on 
23 December 2013, or releasing Greenpeace activists who had stormed a Russian oil rig in 
September 2013.
129
 These moves did however ensure that criticism of Russia’s human rights 
record in Western newspapers such as the Guardian and New York Times was eased prior to 
the Olympics taking place.
130
 Other criticized areas were the construction of so called “White 
elephants”, infrastructural investments costing a lot of money but not actually being of any 
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use post-Olympics, environmental degradation in the area, and the marginalization of the 
local Circassian population.
131
 
Political scientist Richard Arnold argues that the failure of the Sochi Olympics to result in 
“soft power gains” has direct ramifications for the events that followed in Ukraine and Crimea 
directly after Olympics: “Had the human rights situation in Russia been less heavily criticized 
before the Games (so affecting a bigger ‘boost’ to the nation’s soft power), Putin may have 
faced more resistance to turning Russia into an international pariah”.132 The earlier description 
of Hutcheson and Petersson regarding the three pillars of Putin’s legitimacy, points in the 
same direction: If Russia’s status of great power had been confirmed more strongly by the 
Olympic Games, with less criticism, this could have also had the potential to bolster Putin’s 
popularity without the need for a new crisis or external enemy. Petersson and Vamling also 
argue that the developments in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have led to the a complete 
disappearance of the earlier criticized issues from the international agenda or interest.
133
 
Key Points 
It is clear that the transitional period between the Soviet Union and Russia under the Putin 
administration does not show a lot of similarities to the political discourse surrounding sport, 
but by adding contrast, it actually highlights the clear resemblance of sport propaganda in the 
periods surrounding it. Although nationalism and national pride have taken the place of 
communism as a central ideology, the equally crucial concept of ‘great power status’, now for 
Russia instead of the Soviet Union and Communism, has been copied almost identically into 
the narrative presented by the Putin regime, which both implicitly and explicitly looks at the 
Soviet Union narratives for a model to base its own discourse on. The final chapter, looking at 
the doping scandal in Russian sports, will be an excellent event through which an analysis of 
this discourse can be further substantiated.  
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Chapter 4: Russia on the Defensive 
 
This final chapter will discuss the most recent developments in sports in Russia, mentioning 
the continuation of Russian sports policy under the Putin regime. In the last two years, several 
scandals have arisen in the Russian sports environment: an external one with accusations of 
bribery towards FIFA and its selection procedures that led to the FIFA 2018 World Cup being 
planned in Russia, and an internal scandal in the form of accusations of wide-spread, 
potentially state-sponsored doping usage by Russian athletes. The responses by government 
officials in attempts to control the narrative surrounding these scandals are of particular 
importance for establishing the Russian sports narrative and its importance to the Putin regime. 
Outside influence on the Russian sports environment 
Since the Sochi Olympics, political developments have followed each other in rapid 
succession. As a consequence of its Ukraine policy, the Putin regime has been hit by 
international economic and financial sanctions, as well as diplomatic isolation. This of course 
also has significant consequences for the sports environment in Russia. As Makarychev 
mentions, never before has a football World Championship been held in country “under 
international sanctions and in a state of de facto military conflict with its neighbor”.134 The 
annexation of Crimea left the Russian Football Union (RFU) with a very political decision to 
make; whether to include the Crimean clubs into the Russian championship or not. The 
discussions that followed give a great insight into the decision-making processes of Russian 
sports. The RFU members adjourned the voting to clarify the Kremlin’s position first: “If we 
are tasked with getting adjusted [to the Kremlin-approved policy] we’ll certainly do so. 
Anyway we’ll choose the motherland over all the rest. If there is a direct instruction [to vote 
for including Crimean clubs] – then it’s ok”.135 The RFU was however also constrained by 
international sports institutions, such as the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), 
since they threatened with sanctions if the RFU incorporated the Crimean teams.
136
 The 2018 
World Cup thus indirectly undermines Putin’s sovereign power, by ensuring that Russian 
football organizations have to adhere to the standards and decisions made by international 
sports institutions. As Makarychev successfully points out, this leads to the paradox that 
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sports, used to legitimize Putin’s regime and present a top-down narrative of Russia as a self-
sufficient ‘great power’ and a particular brand of nationalism, now undermines this same 
regime by forcing it to accept certain limitations on its influence.
137
 
Sanctions on individuals and companies that are crucial for the FIFA World Cup have made 
preparations increasingly difficult, leading to cuts in the budget for the event. Sports minister 
Mutko dubbed the World-Cup an element of the anti-crisis plan to combat the economic crisis 
in Russia, but the facts that a 10 per cent budget cut was also announced and that Russia has 
asked FIFA for permission to reduce the occupancy of two stadiums, clearly show the 
difficulties Russia currently has to maintain its current course regarding sports.
138
 These 
difficulties have also led to more top-down mobilization, such as administrative pressure over 
corporate business or enforced street cleaning by state employees.
139
 This reinforces the 
problem of Russia attempting to increase its standing in the world through sports while 
preparing for sports events with practices that only widen the gap between Russia and the 
West. 
These problems are further exacerbated by the crisis of legitimacy that the FIFA currently 
faces.  FIFA, one of the few global institutions to fully legitimize the Putin rule, became the 
subject of widespread corruption charges in 2015. Several top officials were arrested on 
charge for corruption and bribes totaling more than $100 million.
140
 A part of the criminal 
proceedings that followed were related to the awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, 
meaning that Russian officials were forced to react. Some of the accusations made in the 
international media directly linked corrupt FIFA officials with the Russian government and its 
business associates, such as Gazprom, the Russian energy company sponsoring FIFA.
141
 
Besides that, Sepp Blatter, the then FIFA president, had even gone so far as to say that 
opponents of the Russian World Cup should better “stay home”, thereby expressing strong 
support, disregarding appeals for boycotts in the light of Russia’s Ukraine policy.142 It should 
thus not come as a surprise that Russian officials defended the FIFA top officials strongly 
when the scandal broke out. Putin accused the US of “Meddling outside its jurisdiction” by 
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arresting FIFA officials, calling it an attempt to stop Blatter’s re-election.143 This was 
complemented by even stronger reactions by Russian officials, explaining the arrests of FIFA 
functionaries as a US-led operation to attempt to deprive Russia of the World Cup, even 
claiming Blatter was under fire because “he has good connections with Russia”.144 Putin even 
stated later that Blatter should be in the running for a Noble prize, since people like him 
“foster mechanisms of cooperation between countries”.145 As Makarychev points out, this 
straightforward defense of Blatter and his associates reveal a major problem with the image of 
an independent strong sovereign Russia: this image requires legitimation by international 
sports organizations if sports are being used for creating and fostering this image. If the 
legitimacy of these organizations becomes questioned, then this directly affects Russia.
146
 
This problem also points out a difference in the effectiveness of the political discourse 
surrounding sports now and that of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the effectiveness 
of the political discourse was mostly important for internal policy goals, and less so for 
international legitimacy. Now, this discourse has become vital for both internal and external 
imagery. Through this increased importance, the fragility of this line of practical reasoning 
can also be shown. With FIFA’s legitimacy put into question, this also puts the legitimacy of 
the Putin administration under threat. The legitimacy of international sports organization was 
never really questioned in the decades following World War II, so this potential flaw was 
perhaps never considered in the decision-making process surrounding the political discourse. 
The Problems pile up: The Russian Doping Scandal 
The Putin administration’s use of sports for its political purposes became even more 
problematic in the period between Sochi 2014 and the 2016 Rio Olympics. A documentary by 
German public broadcaster ARD called Secret doping – How Russia makes its winners, aired 
3 December, 2014 results in WADA commissioning an investigation into the allegations 
against Russia.
147
 While the investigations also accused other organizations and figures, such 
as the then president of the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF), Lamine 
Diack, the main findings of the first WADA independent commission included “criminal 
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conduct on the part of certain individuals and organizations”, “systemic failures within the 
IAAF and Russia that prevent or diminish the possibility of an effective anti-doping program”, 
and the recommendation that WADA withdraw its accreditation of the Moscow laboratory as 
soon as possible, since it was deemed unable to act independently.
148
 This report led to the 
suspension of both the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA) and the Russian Athletics 
Federation (ARAF), but is only the tip of the iceberg. A follow-up report published in January 
2016 also links Russian state-controlled bank VTB with corruption regarding its sponsorship 
of the IAAF and buying TV-broadcasting rights for the 2013 IAAF Moscow World 
Championships.
149
 The response of Andrey Kostin, head of the bank, was very much in line 
with the Kremlin line that was followed during the outbreak of the doping scandal: Kostin 
commented on the accusations stating “This is certainly an outrageous lie”, and "We do see 
coming constantly from the West, I would say, such sophisticated approaches”.150 
 
In the beginning of 2016 several Russian athletes were banned from participating in their 
sports for the use of meldonium, a substance newly added to the banned substances list of 
WADA. Minister of sport Mutko assured the press that these violations were likely to have 
been done “unwillingly”, and as usual in Russian official statements, instead pointed at the 
US, were according to him “nobody does doping tests at those (U.S.) leagues and boxing 
associations”.151 Over the course of 2016, more and more accusations of doping usage are 
made regarding Russia. First, another German documentary claims even more breaching of 
IAAF and WADA rules has taken place.
152
 Second, and more severe, the former director of 
the Russian antidoping laboratory Grigory Rodchenkov, on 12 May 2016, admitted in a long 
interview with the New York Times that he helped facilitate an elaborate state-run doping 
program.
153
 The program, according to Rodchenkov, included Russian anti-doping experts 
and members of the intelligence service who “replaced urine samples tainted by performance-
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enhancing drugs with clean urine collected months earlier”.154 This interview leads to further 
investigation in the US, by the IOC, and WADA. WADA continues with more serious 
allegations, while stating that its investigators were impeded by athletes and “intimidated by 
Russia’s FSB secret service”.155 
The strongest accusations to be presented in 2016 were published in July in the first 
independent person report by sports lawyer Richard Mclaren, which presented that it 
“uncovered a system within Russia for doping athletes directed by senior coaching officials of 
Russian athletics”.156 It added to the previous reports that “the WADA accredited laboratory 
was controlled by the state and acted as the failsafe mechanism to cover up doping”.157 
Russian officials immediately went on the counteroffensive: on July 20, four days after the 
presentation of the Mclaren Report, the state-owned TASS news agency published an article 
arguing that specialists, such as anti-doping expert Professor Nikolai Durmanov, had serious 
doubts regarding certain “technical details” of the report, also stating that “the doping 
problem in Russian sports is very acute, although not any severer than in other countries.
158
 It 
denied any state program and  also accused the report of “zombifying” the distinguished 
public by “blaring ominous abbreviations, such as the FSB and KGB. All this very much 
looks like a disinformation campaign”.159 
Putin’s Response 
The main response to the report, however, came from President Putin himself. In a statement, 
he argued that recent events “involuntary recall the situation in the early 1980s”.160 It is 
interesting to note he concedes that the Soviet Union used “the pretext of an allegedly 
insufficient level of security for the Soviet team”, thus in a sense admitting that the SU had 
other reasons than those presented in the official discourse at the time. He does however 
continue the narrative that athletes were the victims of the reciprocal boycotts, becoming 
“hostages of political confrontation”.161 The statement by Putin shows that the Kremlin did 
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not alter their discourse surrounding sports following the doping accusations. Again, the 
accusation is made that it is others who are “letting politics interfere with sports”, making 
sports “an instrument for geopolitical pressure”.  Putin discredits the report as being based on 
“information given by one single person, an individual with a notorious reputation”, while 
claiming that USADA is trying to “again dictate its will to the entire world sports community” 
by asking for a ban by the entire Russian team from the 2016 Rio Olympics.
162
 The statement 
ends with the promise that Russia “shares in full the Olympic movement’s values of mutual 
respect, solidarity, fairness, and the spirit of friendship and cooperation”.163 If one analyzes 
the entire text and the image it tries to create, the resemblance to the discourse surrounding 
sports in the Soviet Union is almost uncanny.  The commitment of Russia to Olympic values, 
the accusations regarding the US politicizing sports, and even the remarks that innocent clean 
athletes are the real victims, could all be placed in the context of the Olympics during the 
1980s, which he even recalls himself (!), and wouldn’t even be noticed as stemming from a 
different time. Representatives from the Russian foreign ministry, TASS and the minister of 
sport all weighed in with similar statements, calling the report “a blow not only on us but also 
on global sports”, and arguing that the “’doping scandal’ is part of Washington’s ongoing 
effort to isolate Russia and to build opposition to Putin inside Russia”.164 
In the end, the IOC decided to not ban the Russian team from the 2016 Rio Olympics, but did 
establish a set of special conditions for all Russian athletes wishing to compete in the Games. 
These included letting international federations have the final say for each sport (the IAAF 
banned all Russian athletes), and requiring that all Russian athletes had undergone adequate 
international doping tests in the period prior to the Olympics, and not being implicated in any 
possible way in the Mclaren report.
165
 The International Paralympic Committee (IPC) did 
however issue a blanket ban on Russian athletes from competing at the Rio Paralympic 
Games.
166
 While the decision regarding the Olympics was met with a grateful response by 
then minister of sport Mutko, the ban of Russian athletes from the Paralympics was met with 
an extremely harsh response by Putin, who said the IPC “is humiliating itself”, saying the 
decision “is beyond all boundaries of legal norms, moral principles and humanity”, while 
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again arguing that the ban was solely based on political reasons.
167168
 The Russians that were 
allowed to compete in the Olympics in the end reached 4
th
 place in the overall standing, with 
fifty-six medals, which was the worst result for a Russian team in twenty years. 
Protecting Russian Prestige 
From the outset, the response has been to discredit the reports on doping abuse. Most 
importantly, Russian officials have upheld that the doping issues in Russia were in no way 
state-facilitated: Instead, minister of sport Mutko stated “I very much regret that many 
coaches and athletes themselves are convinced that you can’t win without doping”.169 This 
tactic should not come as a surprise. By shifting the blame away from the state as a whole, to 
certain individuals, it becomes possible to dismiss these individuals with national prestige 
remaining unblemished (at least in the official narrative). In fact, Russia went on the offensive, 
with Mutko announcing to the world that Russia’s Ministry of Sports will file lawsuits to civil 
courts against any author claiming Russia has state support for doping.
170
 Whether the 
conclusions of the Mclaren report are accurate or not, the Putin regime has done everything 
within its power to attempt to establish a different narrative. This also included setting up a 
Russian investigative committee to scrutinize the Mclaren report, as well as an independent 
Anti-Doping Commission through the ROC. This Commission, first proposed directly by 
President Putin, is led by Vitaly Smirnov, an honorary member of the IOC as well as 
president emeritus of the ROC.
171
 Smirnov stated when starting his mission that “we should 
find out why some international sport organizations have been unjust to Russia”, adding that 
“we are going to look into what caused such a mass phenomenon that a large group of athletes 
violated the doping rules”.172 
In general, the discourse surrounding sports has in no way changed since the doping scandal. 
The accusations have been brushed aside as a politically motivated move by the west (more 
specifically the US), whereas Russia continues to be the great sporting nation it has always 
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been. The public in Russia seems to buy into this messaging as well: Two-thirds of Russians 
(63 per cent) see the Paralympics ban and accusations towards Russia as politically motivated, 
according to an opinion poll by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center.
173
 53 Per cent of 
those surveyed also stated they felt pride when watching Russian athletes perform, showing 
once again the clear correlation between national prestige and sports that not just the Putin 
regime, but many countries across the world are trying to capitalize on.
174
 Putin, speaking at 
an international sports forum tellingly called ‘Russia – Country of Sports’, continued along 
the same lines earlier established in his regime, arguing that “We must do everything possible 
together to ensure the cleanliness of sport so that it can become absolutely open and be 
outside politics so that its ideas and values unite countries and peoples”.175 Then, almost as a 
sidenote, he added, that “when we speak about the cleanliness of sport, we mean not only 
politics”, making doping use sounds as a secondary issue, with the politicization of sports as a 
much larger threat.
176
 In the official discourse, the doping scandal has not affected the 
greatness of Russia as a sport nation, in fact, it has almost enhanced it. President of the ROC 
Alexander Zhukov interpreted the results of the 2016 Olympics so that despite the difficulties 
of the “constant doping scandals”, “our athletes performed brilliantly in Rio and proved that 
our successes do not depend on any ‘magical cocktails,’ made up by certain schemers”.177 
A Russian Counteroffensive? 
Sport has in no way lost its prominent position in the Putin administration. On October 19 
2016, despite the suspicions raised against Minister of Sport Mutko in the Mclaren report, he 
was appointed as a vice-premier in the Russian cabinet, with Deputy Sports Minister Pavel 
Kolobkov taking charge of the ministry.
178
 As prime-minister Medvedev stated, this was done 
in order for sport, “which is one of the most important spheres of social activities” to get a 
larger representation in the cabinet.
179
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When the second Mclaren report was published on December 9 2016, the previously 
established Independent Public Anti-Doping Commission immediately countered with Vitaly 
Smirnov stating that “despite the presented accusations I would like to point out that there has 
never been an organized system in Russia for the falsification (of doping samples)”.180 
Another component of Russia’s response has been to point out that it is not only Russian 
athletes who are caught using performance-enhancing substances. Putin stated that “As we 
have come to know – and the World Anti-Doping Agency is not denying that – dozens or 
hundreds of athletes are taking these (banned) substances. Does anybody know that? No one 
does. Everything is done secretly”.181 Interestingly enough, the new Minister of Sports 
Kolobkov, condemned the definition Mclaren gave in his second report of an “institutional 
conspiracy”, stating “There has not been and could not have been any conspiracy”.182 The 
image presented here is that of widespread secretive doping abuse, while on the other side 
Russia is dealing with violations, clearing itself of doping, dismissing everyone involved in 
the doping scandals. Kolobkov even says “It could be great if other states investigate anti-
doping violations as steadfastly as we do”.183 
ROC president Zhukov declared in November that Russia had cleaned up its doping program 
and should be allowed to return to all international competitions, and during the last few 
months, Russian officials have focused their public statements on pointing to other potential 
doping abuses.
184
 A hacking collective operating under the name of ‘Tsar Team’, also known 
as Fancy Bear, illegally gained access to WADA’s database, releasing athlete medical data. 
WADA stated that according to law enforcement authorities, “these attacks are originating out 
of Russia”.185 While the Kremlin denied any involvement in the hacking, Vladimir Putin was 
quick to use the leaked data to point out “double standards” in anti-doping policy: “Healthy 
athletes take medications outlawed for others, while people, who obviously suffer from grave 
illnesses and disabilities, are barred from participation in Paralympic Games on sheer 
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suspicion”, referring back to the IPC’s ban for Russian Paralympians.186 While it is not within 
the scope of this paper to determine whether the Russian goverment was involved in the 
hacking of WADA’s database or not, it is certainly interesting to note that the lists published 
by Fancy Bear, detailing a large amount of athletes who gained so called Therapeutic Use 
Exemptions for otherwise banned substances, contained several US star athletes and only one 
Russian athlete.
187
 Regardless of how the data became public, it is clear it provides Russian 
officials with more ammunition for their counteraccusations regarding doping use in the 
sports world. 
The latest developments in the Russian discourse surrounding the doping scandal seemed to 
indicate a change in tone by Russian officials. According to an interview in the New York 
Times, current head of RUSADA, Anna Antseliovich, admitted that in fact “it was an 
institutional conspiracy”, and that Russian officials said they longer disputed a damning set of 
facts that detailed a doping program “with few, if any, historical precedents”.188 This was 
however immediately countered by Russian officials: RUSADA stated that “the words of 
acting General Director Antselovich were distorted and taken out of the context”.189 In fact, 
the remark of Antselovich was meant to prove the opposite point, saying that Mclaren had 
given up using the phrase “state-sponsored doping system” and used the words institutional 
conspiracy instead, “thus excluding the involvement of the country’s top leadership”.190 This 
was followed by a warning of Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Mutko that “Russian officials 
must carefully comb through their statements regarding doping abuse issues when 
communicating with foreign media outlets and should also request personal authorization 
prior to such interview’s final issuance”.191 In the end, this small hick-up thus only confirmed 
the current tightly controlled official narrative surrounding Russian sports, and a change of 
direction does not seem likely. 
Key points 
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Although the discourse surrounding the Russian doping scandal is very much still underway, 
it is clear that, by the cut-off point of this paper (January 2017), certain patterns are clearly 
discernable. The discourse based on nationalism and Russian pride, described in the previous 
chapter, are prominent in the responses of state officials to the accusations made in the 
independent reports sanctioned by WADA. The conclusions of these reports are seen as an 
attack on Russia as a great sporting nations. Any claims of institutionalized doping use are 
flat-out rejected. Sport and nationalism are heavily intertwined, and because of this and the 
relation of these components to the legitimacy of the Putin regime, there is too much at stake 
for the Putin administration to accept the conclusions of the Mclaren report at face value. This 
has led to a contestation of the facts on which debate and dialogue could be based. One could 
argue that this a very common phenomenon in the current political climate: ‘alternative facts’ 
and ‘fake news’ are everywhere, and regardless of the validity of the conclusions of the 
Mclaren report, Russia is ensuring that the sports world is now also engulfed in this global 
trend. 
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Conclusion 
 
Sports has risen to prominence more and more in the last decades, and this trend does not 
seem likely to change. This is likely to be accompanied by even more political interest and 
influence on sports, especially with regards to mega-events such as the Olympics or the FIFA 
World Cup. Russia has been in the spotlight of Western news sources for various reasons in 
the last few years, and sports played a major role in this development. The corruption scandal 
surrounding FIFA had direct consequences for the legitimacy of having a World Cup in 
Russia, and the Sochi Olympics of 2014 have been tainted by strong accusations of systemic 
doping abuse with aid from within the government by Russian athletes. Regardless of whether 
these accusations are completely accurate, or that there’s truth to the Russian response 
denying government involvement, these events have had direct consequences for the political 
usage of sport under the Putin regime. 
The main question of this thesis was aimed at explaining the response of the Putin regime to 
the Mclaren report and subsequent developments. In order to do so, analyzing the history of 
sports in Russia is crucial. If one places the statements and policies of Russian government 
officials about sport in a historical perspective, a number of remarkable similarities can be 
pointed out between the last decade and the discourse put forward by USSR officials during 
the period of 1950-1985. After the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in which 
sports understandably lost some its importance in turbulent times, sports has been placed high 
on the political agenda again. Firstly, both USSR officials and the current Russian regime 
insist that sport should not be “politicized”. According to this narrative, sport should not be 
used for any political messaging, and Russia is presented as a loyal and exemplary member of 
the Olympic movement. Secondly, although this narrative argues that sport is outside of 
politics, it is clear that the Putin regime is attempting to gain prestige, a form of soft power, by 
investing heavily in sports in general, and elite sports in particular. Similar to the USSR, 
targets have been set for mass participation in sports (with numbers that might be more 
accurate than the inflated numbers of the Soviet period), and elite athletes are supported by 
the state. With the great power status of Russia being central to the legitimacy and popularity 
of the Putin regime, it makes sense that international prestige through sports becomes an 
important policy area. Putin has on many occasions personally intervened in sports policy. 
The fact that Minister of Sport Mutko was recently promoted to Vice-premier despite the 
current crisis that Russian sports find itself in, also attest to this importance.  Thirdly, Russia 
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has continuously been presented as a great sporting nation. In interviews, international sport 
forums, and any type of public event, Russian officials have emphasized that Russia has 
always been a greatly successful nation in the Olympics, making the USSR legacy its own. 
Thus, although communism as a central component of the sports discourse has been replaced 
with nationalism as an ideology, the idea of Russia as a great sporting nation, with a great 
power status, has been copied almost directly into the discourse used by the Putin regime. 
This narrative could have been considered problematic with the recent doping scandal and the 
accusations of corruption surrounding the election of the FIFA 2018 World Cup to Russia, but 
these scandals have in fact led to an even more rigidly structured political discourse 
surrounding sport in Russia. The scandals have helped to make the narrative even more 
similar to that of the Cold War period, with Russian officials describing both the accusations 
of the independent WADA report as well as the corruption accusations aimed at FIFA 
officials as an American-led “anti-Russia campaign”. The scandals have helped to fit sports 
into a narrative that can be found in other aspects of the current Kremlin discourse, with the 
Russian government protecting its citizens, in this case its athletes, from unjust behavior by 
outside parties. These outside parties, usually describes as the West in general, but sometimes 
pointing to the US specifically, are using sports for their own gains, while Russia continues to 
be the exemplary member of the Olympic movement. Despite overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary, the Russian narrative remains that of certain individual doping mistakes, and 
certainly no worse than any other country’s athletes. The recent date released by hackers 
(Russian government steered or not), helps to portray Russia as a victim, where athletes are 
not presented with the same opportunities of being granted exemptions for certain substances, 
even if those substances are not similar to those that Russian athletes tested positive for. 
Instead of accepting the legitimacy and arbitrary power of independent international 
organizations, Russia established its own investigative commissions, possibly to create further 
doubt surrounding the accusations. 
The explanation for this rigid approach, with a narrative that seems set in stone, not be strayed 
away from, seems to lie in the close correlation between nationalism, sport, and the legitimacy 
of Putin’s administration. With the Ukraine crisis and the following economic sanctions 
causing difficulties regarding the other two pillars of legitimacy for Putin, it becomes 
understandable to choose this narrative as the outcome of of rational, practical reasoning 
underlying the decision-making process. Accepting any other narrative, or choosing to change 
course in their own narrative, could have ramifications for Putin’s powerbase at home. Thus, 
46 
 
the chosen discourse most likely stems from argumentation that puts consolidation of power 
above all else. As noted in the title of this thesis, one could argue that while the discourse of 
the Putin regime is strongly influenced by that of the Soviet era, a major difference is that it is 
now being used as a defense against the Mclaren report, which through its accusations also 
threatens the legitimacy of the Putin regime as a whole, instead of as an ‘attack’, to show the 
superiority of the Soviet Union to the world. 
The developments of the last two years could have serious consequences for the coming years. 
As Putin pointed out himself, the 1980s led to a political situation that made athletes and 
Olympic tournaments ‘victims’ of the Cold War. By not accepting the judgement and 
decisions of international organizations that at least attempt to be completely neutral and 
independent of politics, there is a significant chance that sporting events will become 
extremely politicized again, leading to boycotts, international scandals and athletes who 
become the ‘play puppets’ of their respective political regimes. Despite the claim that Russia 
is trying to “keep politics out of sport”, it is clear that Russia is escalating the situation by not 
accepting the judgement or narrative of WADA, the IOC, Interpol (in the case of the FIFA 
scandal) and others but instead sticks to its own narrative, which seems to have direct links to 
Soviet times. 
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